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This paper argues that investment in agriculture has a large and continuing 
developmental importance in terms of both economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Moreover, targeted public resources have proven to be indispensable in achieving 
these results. Both arguments are supported with novel analyses which update and 
strengthen the traditional case for agriculture-led development with public-sector 
involvement. But despite the strong case for agriculture-led development strategies, 
the authors find that over the last three decades the financial resources allocated 
towards this sector have strongly declined. It is suggested that a shift towards new 
development paradigms since 1980 might be a significant explanation for this 
apparent Agricultural Paradox. This conjecture is tested with data on market reform 
impacts, PRSP contents and analyses of the intellectual resources devoted to the study 
of agriculture in development by both practitioners and researchers. The authors 





This paper has benefited from extensive discussions with Andrew Dorward, Tim Foy and Rachel 
Slater, but we are responsible for all opinions and any errors.   2
1.  Introduction 
 
This paper is an overt essay in persuasion. We attempt to persuade readers of the 
inefficient and systematic bias in the allocation of developmental resources over the 
last three decades, with the bias going against the agriculture sector. The bias is 
inefficient because no currently advanced country of substantial size became 
advanced without the agriculture sector achieving substantial productivity gains in the 
early stages of development. The bias is systematic because it has fundamental 
institutional causes grounded in both the political economy of developing economies 
and in theoretical views held within the development profession. In this paper we will 
make the case for the inefficiency of the bias, explore the systematic institutional 
causes of the bias, and strongly argue for its correction. 
Numerous authors have observed this pervasive bias against agriculture. 
Biases against rural development were part of the backwash effects identified by 
Myrdal as early as 1957, by World Bank President Robert McNamara in several 
speeches in 1971, by Michael Lipton, who popularised the term “urban bias” in 1977, 
and in the widely read policy analyses of Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970), Krueger, 
Valdes, and Schiff (1991) and Binswanger and Deininger (1997). Nevertheless, the 
bias against agriculture persists in contemporary development policy, a fact noted by 
other more recent works, referenced below. The objective of this paper is to update 
and synthesize these claims into a cohesive representation of the long, persistent and 
extremely harmful neglect of agriculture. We will use theoretical arguments and 
empirical analyses (using both primary and secondary data) to argue that investments 
in agriculture are both pro-growth (section 2) and pro-poor (section 3). Moreover, 
successful agricultural development requires active public sector involvement, 
especially at the initial stages. Yet despite this, we note that agricultural development 
has been increasingly under-funded over the last three decades (section 4). This 
paradox – the neglect of agriculture despite its obvious importance in economic 
theory and historical experience – is then explained in terms of a variety of biases: 
biases with LDC governments, aid donors and in OECD governments in general, and 
also within major developmental institutions such as The World Bank and the UN 
(Section 5). We conclude the paper with a critical discussion of recent developments 
in the bias against agriculture (section 6).    3
Several features of our approach should be noted at the outset. First, we paint 
our picture of the neglect of agriculture with a broad brush. With respect to public 
policies, for example, we do not discuss in any detail the type of agricultural policies 
which should be pursued, but instead focus on the overall efforts of LDC governments 
and foreign aid donors, rather than on the efficacy of their policies per se.
1 Secondly, 
our approach is distinctly empirical, attempting to extend measurement to some novel 
areas. In particular, we attempt to quantify the bias in financial and intellectual 
resources devoted to agricultural development as well as any bias in policy practice. 
In addition to the usual scientific benefits incurred by the rigour of empirical analysis, 
we hope that by letting the numbers do the talking we may persuade non-agricultural 
economists that this is not simply a case of agricultural economists feeling the neglect 
of their pet love. On the contrary, the neglect of agriculture is inextricably linked to 
the neglect of the poor, of the unhealthy and the uneducated, and even to the neglect 
of industrial and urban development, as we demonstrate in the next section. 
 
2. Agriculture, Industrialization and Economic Growth  
  
No currently developed country of some size has successfully industrialized without 
achieving substantial productivity gains in the agricultural sector in the initial stages 
of development. Economic development entails a structural transformation in the 
composition of production, in tandem with increased urbanization. This has seldom 
proceeded without substantial gains in the agricultural sector at early stages of 
development (the only exceptions being small city states such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore). Those theories of growth which are most relevant and applicable to the 
poorest countries, such as the two-sector Lewis model, give a good indication of how 
the agricultural and industrial sectors interact. Lewis (1954) himself identified the 
rural sector as a source of “cheap” labour, in the sense that because so much rural 
labour is surplus, the opportunity cost of its relocation to the modern sector is low or 
even zero. The rural sector is also capable of providing an expanded source of 
loanable funds to the infant modern sector, as well as inexpensive food (which helps 
to keep real wage inflation low in the modern sector), increased food security and an 
                                                 
1 In addition to some of the classic studies highlighted above, there are plenty of other recent studies 
which engage in quite detailed cross-country policy analyses. See Byerlee et al. (2005) for a recent 
example.   4
important source of domestic demand for modern sector goods. However, we also 
know from the empirical work of Adelman and Morris (1997), discussed in more 
detail below, that the Lewis model requires an open economy setting: the agricultural 
sector usually has a short run comparative advantage, so that agricultural exports may 
provide a vital source of foreign exchange for the purchase of capital inputs into the 
modern industrial sector, which is usually only a sector which has a long run 
comparative advantage. 
Many theoretical economists and applied policymakers, however, have 
ignored or underplayed the role of agriculture in economic development. Perhaps this 
is not surprising since the Lewis model can easily be misinterpreted as an 
industrialization model, while many other prominent models in the 1950s, with 
varying degrees of explicitness, emphasised a Big Industrial Push as the key to 
successful economic development following Rosenstein-Rodan (1944).
2 
Such plans and theories not only ignore the more realistic implications of two-
sector models but also much contemporary evidence. It has been well established that 
the advanced Western countries had comparatively high levels of agricultural 
productivity before and during the Industrial Revolution. Indeed, some authors claim 
that a Green Revolution occurred before or contemporaneously to the Industrial 
Revolution (Rostow, 1960; Crafts, 1985a; Allen, 1994; Overton, 1996),
3 while 
Adelman and Morris (1988) also present evidence that it was the strong agricultural 
performers in the 19
th Century that subsequently developed most rapidly
4.  
                                                 
2 This is not just intellectual history, as some topical examples discussed by Easterly (2005) show. The 
UN Millennium Project recommended in January 2005 “a big push of basic investments between now 
and 2015” while its Director suggests that “[A] combination of investments … can enable African 
economies to break out of the poverty trap. These interventions need to be applied … jointly since they 
strongly reinforce one another” (Sachs, 2005:208). British PM Blair’s Commission for Africa launched 
a report that claims that “Africa requires a comprehensive ‘big push’ on many fronts at once.” In July 
2005 the G-8 Summit similarly considered an increase in aid to Africa to finance such a ‘Big Push’, 
and celebrities such as U2 singer Bono and actress Sharon Stone have been raising the money. It is the 
‘lamentable return of the Big Push’ (Easterly, 2005). 
3 While this claim has recently been disputed by Clark (1999), he also presents evidence that the 
Western countries – especially the industrial leader, Great Britain, had achieved comparatively high 
levels of agricultural productivity before the onset of the Industrial Revolution. Maddison (2001) 
provides similar evidence that the Western countries were already considerably wealthier than the rest 
of the world in 1800. 
4 Adelman and Morris (1988) report the following results (p. 133-146): “Great Britain, France, 
Germany, the United States, Canada, Japan, and Sweden . . . For these countries, a substantial period of 
rising labour productivity in agriculture preceded the first sustained surge of modern industrial 
expansion. Then, as industrialization progressed, the agricultural sector played an important role in 
providing labour, raw materials, and/or capital to the industrial sector in providing a market for both 
industrial and agricultural products . . . . . Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland . . . 
whose agricultural sectors were radically transformed during the last quarter of the 19
th century from   5
In Table 1 below we present evidence compiled by Clark (1999) on total factor 
productivity (TFP) levels in agriculture in 1850 relative to the United Kingdom (the 
industrial leader at the time), as well as subsequent TFP growth in agriculture. 
Countries are ranked according to their initial agricultural TFP levels. Two facts 
should be noted. First, the top four countries in terms of initial agricultural TFP, 
excluding Ireland, were the first to industrialize. Second, among the late 
industrializers, the countries which most successfully industrialized had the highest 
agricultural TFP growth (Germany, Austria, Sweden, Hungary, Denmark, 
Switzerland). Third, the late but successful industrializers had agricultural TFP 
growth rates higher than the early industrializers (unsuccessful Russia is excluded 
from this), indicating convergence. Thus we have strong evidence from the earliest 
developers that reaching a comparatively high level of productivity in agriculture was 
a necessary condition for successful industrialization and long run development. 
                                                                                                                                            
extensive cultivation to the production of human capital-intensive crops for export. Export markets 
became even more important to agriculture than domestic markets.” All these countries went on to 
become advanced countries relatively quickly. In contrast, the other countries in their study were 
relatively slow to advance (Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Spain) and many are still not considered fully 
advanced economies (Argentina, Russia, Brazil, India, Egypt, Burma).” Moreover, Adelman and 
Morris argued that land abundance was a critical factor in determining successful subsequent 
development among these last two sets of classes. 
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Table 1. Agricultural TFP levels in 1850 and subsequent TFP growth 
 Country  TFP 1850  TFP growth 
United Kingdom  10  0.19 
Netherlands 76  0.82 
Belgium 73  0.83 
























France 66  0.46 
Germany 56  1.53 
Austria 50  1.21 
Sweden 49  1.03 
Hungary 41  1.11 
Russia 34  0.34 
Denmark  n.a.  1.31 
Norway  n.a.  0.48 
Switzerland  n.a.  0.78 






















Poland  n.a.  0.90 
  Correlation (TFP, TFP growth)  -0.42 
Notes: *Ireland was an exception, in that it was not a particularly early industrializer. Ireland’s 
productivity may nevertheless have been distorted in 1850 because of high levels of rural emigration 
following the Potato Famine. 
Sources: TFP 1850 = Clark 1993 Table 4.1; TFP growth = Van Zanden 1991 Table 4 
 
 
Of course, that agricultural development was an initial condition for successful 
industrialization of the now advanced economies does not necessarily imply that this 
conditional also holds for modern developing economies, including the so-called 
‘miracles’. But empirical work in the identification of the causes and patterns of both 
short and long run growth also consistently identifies agricultural development as an 
important pre-condition of structural transformation. Adelman and Morris (1967), for 
example, in their cross-country study of the interdependent socioeconomic 
determinants of growth in contemporary developing economies, found that 
agricultural transformation was important both in the manner predicted by Lewis and   7
in terms of breaking down the traditional social elements of the agricultural sector.
5 
But at later stages of development the formal agricultural sector continues to serve 
important functions in sustaining industrial development, chiefly in the manner 
envisioned by Lewis. 
Current ‘Big Push’ thinking not only contradicts economic history and 
development theory. It also ignores much contemporary evidence on the longer-term 
implications of agricultural development, compiled since the early work by Ranis and 
Fei (1961), Johnston and Mellor (1961), Adelman and Morris (1967) and Little et al. 
(1970). Follow-up research has also strongly confirmed the stylized fact that 
agricultural development precedes and feeds industrialization. Krueger et al. (1991) 
and Stern (1989) have argued that successful industrializers (including the East Asian 
‘miracles’) had only modest discrimination against the agricultural sector (which also 
decreased over time) and high levels of productivity growth, whereas unsuccessful 
industrializers often heavily discriminated against the agricultural sector through trade 
and pricing policies, and had agricultural growth ranging from modest to very poor 
indeed. Timmer (1998, 2002) and DFID (2005a) summarise the key roles that 
agricultural growth has in enabling broader economic growth and development to 
occur. These are the ‘transmission mechanisms’ from agricultural productivity 
improvements to broader growth:  
• generation of additional demand for goods and services produced outside of the 
agricultural sector as agricultural-based incomes rise – the size of agriculture and its 
multiplier effects is critically important here; 
• generation of savings through increased farm incomes which can then be invested 
both in agriculture and in other sectors, thus enabling structural transformation; 
• provision of an labour force available for the industrial sector; 
• provision of affordable food which allows urban areas to develop and maintain 
wages rates at competitive levels; and 
• provision of a raw material base to support manufacturing (the processing of 
agricultural commodities has often been the first activity to be industrialised in many 
countries). 
 
                                                 
5The monetization of the agricultural sector, especially, serves an institutional purpose as well as an 
economic one.   8
Empirical work clearly illustrates the importance of these links. Timmer’s 
(2003) analysis of the Kenyan economy showed that between 1987 and 2001, the rate 
of growth of the nonagricultural sector depended strongly on growth in agriculture. 
Non-agricultural growth increased by 30% of the agricultural growth rate in the same 
year, and by 10% of the agricultural growth rate in the previous year. Stern (1996) 
found a similar and significant relationship between growth in the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors during 1965–1980 for a large number of developing 
countries. Bravo-Ortega and Lederman (2005) econometrically examine a sample of 
128 developing countries for the 1960-2000 period and find that they have 
experienced positive effects from growth in agricultural GDP to the rest of the 
economy. This confirms Timmer’s (2002) report of positive correlations of 
agricultural growth and growth of national GDP per capita, but Bravo-Ortega and 
Lederman (2005) additionally employ various estimation methods and tests, 
confirming that causality runs from the agricultural sector to the rest of the economy. 
They also consider a broader measure for welfare incorporating GDP, the average 
income of the poor, macroeconomic volatility and environmental measures (air 
pollution, water withdrawals and deforestation). They find that in developing 
countries, a one per cent increase in agricultural GDP causes a welfare increase of 
more than one percent, varying over regions (and depending on the weight given to 
welfare components) between 1.15 % and 1.98 %.  
Much of the previous cross-country work on agriculture and development is 
limited to studies on European development (by economic historians) or early post-
colonial development (e.g. by Adelman and Morris (1967) for the period 1950-1963) 
and fairly conventional (linear) cross country studies. We therefore revisit the issue of 
whether substantial agricultural development is a necessary condition for sustainable 
development overall using a relatively novel technique. Rather than explaining growth 
in a linear regression model, we analyse the role of agricultural development by 
examining whether growth accelerations are sustained or not. 
There are a variety of measures of agricultural and industrial development, but 
very few which are simultaneously comparable. Ideally we would like to measure 
agricultural, industrial and services output per capita, but labour force data on a 
sectoral basis is seriously incomplete for many countries. We therefore chose to 
measure “urban output per capita” defined as services and industrial output divided by 
the urban population, and “rural output per capita”, defined as agricultural output   9
divided by the rural population. Both variables are measured in 1985 PPP dollars from 
the Summers and Heston (2002) tables, Version 6.1. 
Clearly the measures in question are not perfect. For example, not all rural 
inhabitants work in agriculture, and the variables do not, strictly speaking, reflect 
labour productivity differences. However, it seems quite unlikely that these 
measurement errors will systematically bias our interpretations
6 s o  t h a t  w e  c a n  
reliably use these measures as broad indicators of the welfare and the productivity of 
rural and urban populations in an event analysis. The events we investigate are 
aggregate GDP growth accelerations, as identified by Hausman et al. (2004). 
Acceleration years are defined as those in which the growth rate increased by 2 
percentage points and is sustained at 3.% p.a. or more for 7 years. Moreover, post-
acceleration output must always be higher than the pre-acceleration peak. Among 
other things, Hausman et al. (2004) use this data to investigate whether accelerations 
are sustained or not, but they do not consider whether the sources of accelerations 
were urban/industrial or rural/agricultural. 
In Table 2 we record our findings. The table groups countries according to 
their acceleration experiences, or what Adelman and Morris would term ‘alternative 
development paths’. The columns indicate the year of the aggregate output 
acceleration identified by Hausman et al. (2004), the aggregate average GDP per 
capita growth rate in the subsequent 20 years, average urban and rural output per 
capita growth in the 15 years around the acceleration, and rural output per capita at 
the time of acceleration. 
The question we want to answer is ‘Is there a relationship between rural output 
per capita (levels and/or growth) and the sustainability of growth accelerations?’ To 
investigate this we group countries according to various dimensions of the initial level 
of rural output per capita, its growth rate, and whether or not accelerations were 
                                                 
6 Two type of biases could be induced: biases in levels and biases in growth rates. Biases in levels are 
likely to exist because of different definitions of urban populations (minimum population sizes for the 
definition of urban centres differ across countries to some extent), and structural differences (some 
agricultural countries may have reasonably large rural service centres). The latter could also affect 
growth rates. If during transformation rural agricultural workers move to the rural services or light 
manufacturing sectors without actually becoming urban residents, then rural output per capita growth 
could be understated and urban output per capita growth would be overstated. However, it seems 
unlikely that that structural transformations are so significantly incommensurate to urbanization rates 
that these biases seriously affect our results. There are other biases too – such as the exclusion of 
informal markets – but these apply to all data, and not just the sectoral decompositions documented 
here. 
   10
sustained or not. We also add two separate resource-rich groups. We discuss some 
particular cases below, but additional comments can be found in the last column in 





























Group 1. Resource rich countries in which the rural sector did well 
Group 1. Starting from low levels, with very strong rural output growth and sustained overall growth 
Tunisia 1968  4.2 3.0 4.4 705
Reasonable starting level of productivity accompanied by high 
levels of agricultural growth over several years. 
China 1978  6.2 3.0 3.5 320
Growth in agriculture very high and was a major source of 
poverty reduction and reducer of regional inequality. 
Korea, Rep.  1962  6.0 3.0 5.0 833
Reasonable starting level of productivity with high, sustained 
levels of rural output growth throughout industrialization. 
Taiwan, China  1961  7.1 4.3 6.7 688
Data for Taiwan only relate to estimates based on sectoral 
shares; Data show similar pattern to Korea. 
Group 2. Starting from low levels, with modest to strong rural output growth and mostly sustained overall growth. 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1976  3.9 3.0 0.2 930
Growth around acceleration quite low, but solid growth before 
and after, and reasonably high initial level of rural output. 
Dominican Rep.  1969  3.2 1.2 3.4 629
Mostly strong rural output growth throughout, although 
industrialization faltered in 1980s. 
Syria 1974  3.4 4.4 5.4 797
Volatile rural sector, but with reasonably high initial productivity 
and strong average growth. 
India 1982  3.9 3.1 1.2 579
Limited growth on the back of Green Revolution (mostly north-
western states) but sustenance of growth mostly due to other 
sectors; poverty reduction quite low. 
Pakistan 1979  2.8 2.9 1.9 454
Solid growth before 1990s when industrial growth collapsed; 
poverty reduction quite low. 
Sri Lanka  1979  2.8 2.7 1.0 607
Fitful growth in agricultural sector, although rural output per 
capita was high and poverty quite low at time of acceleration. 
Group 3. Starting from low levels, with modest, volatile or unsustained rural output growth and unsustained overall growth 
Algeria 1975  1.3 9.3 3.8 633
One year of large rural output growth, one year of large 
industrial growth.   12 
Cameroon 1972  1.2 -1.9 3.2 662
Strong growth in rural output for 7 years after acceleration 
(4.69%), but not much in industry. 
Chad 1973  0.4 -2.2 4.5 483
Several bumper crops in agriculture which were not sustained 
(growth close to 20%); no growth in industry 
Ghana 1965  1.0 4.8 6.0 474
Reasonable growth in agriculture in 1960s before 
macroeconomic collapse in 1970s 
Jordan  1973  2.2 2.9 6.3 473 Very volatile rural output growth. 
Lesotho 1971  2.0 13.3 1.2 312
Starkly negative growth prior to acceleration (-8.4% in 7 years 
prior), and then a few bumper crops; volatile growth path. 
Malawi 1970  1.2 0.2 3.0 208
Very low rural output per capita, and rural output growth 
volatile and never sustained. 
Mali 1972  0.2 2.4 0.7 595 Low  agricultural  productivity and only a few bumper crops. 
Rwanda 1975  0.1 4.2 -0.6 439
Low initial rural output and negative growth in 7 years before 
acceleration (-2.05), for several years after acceleration, which 
preceded decline in industrial output 
Trinidad & 
Tobago  1975  1.4 3.8 2.5 644 Quite low initial rural output levels and very volatile growth. 
Uganda 
 1977  2.3 1.6 0.2 487
Low rural output levels, and no real agricultural productivity 
growth; acceleration was caused by large but unsustained 
industrial growth 
Zimbabwe 
  1964 4.2 4.5 8.3 331
Low initial level of productivity, but despite several years of 
strong growth both urban and rural output collapsed; growth 
also volatile. 
Group 4. Starting from initially high levels of output, with sustained growth 
Mauritius 1983  4.3 4.0 -0.3 1680
Some rural output growth accompanying 5 years after 
acceleration. 
Malaysia 1970  4.1 2.4 2.8 1287
High initial level of productivity and strong growth throughout 
industrialization period. 
Chile 1986  4.0 2.6 6.1 2683
Productive agriculture to begin with and very high growth 
during and throughout acceleration. 
Group 5. Starting from initially high levels of output, without sustained growth 
Paraguay 1974  2.5 3.7 1.6 1822
Solid rural output growth and reasonably high productivity 
before 1981, and volatile since. 
Uruguay  1974  2.0 2.4 1.3 7528 Quite high agricultural productivity levels, but no real growth;   13 
industrial growth not sustained. 
Brazil 1967  4.1 3.6 4.1 957
Strong growth in both sectors prior to collapse in early 1970s. 
Growth acceleration was considered anti-poor. 
Colombia  1967  2.4 2.4 2.7 1758 Modest balanced growth in both sectors. 
Ecuador 1970  2.8 4.3 1.5 870
Weak growth in agriculture (-0.72% in 7 years prior to 
acceleration); industrial output ended in abruptly in 1976. 
Group 6. Resource rich countries in which the rural sector also developed rapidly. 
Botswana 1969  7.4 -4.6 4.5 466
Rural output was very low to begin with, but experienced high 
growth subsequently. 
Indonesia 1967  4.7 3.2 0.0 561
Acceleration was due to industrial growth including oil 
production, but growth in rural output from 1976 to 1998 was 
high (3.1%): Indonesia translated petroleum revenues into 
poverty-reducing investments in the rural sector. 
Group 7. Resource rich countries in which the rural sector did poorly. 
Congo, Rep.  1978  2.5 4.2 4.1 334
Growth collapsed in rural output per capita in the 14 years after 
acceleration was a mere 0.26%. Industry collapsed in 1985. 
Nigeria 1967  0.4 2.7 -0.7 555
Low initial rural output levels and negative rural output growth 
around acceleration. 
Correlation with 
GDP per capita 
growth  -- 1.0 -0.08 0.34 -0.05
Aggregate growth in (t,t+20) period only positively correlated 
with rural output growth in (t-7,t+7) period. The data quite strongly confirm previous findings on the important role of 
agricultural growth in successful transitions. In the first group are three countries 
regarded as economic miracles (South Korea, Taiwan and China), and Tunisia, which 
has also performed strongly in the last thirty years. These countries had reasonable 
rural output levels at the time of their takeoffs as well as very strong and sustained 
rural output growth. In the last 20 years, China stands out as the latest and perhaps 
greatest miracle. Rural output growth in China was actually stronger than industrial 
growth in the post-1978 period (chiefly due to the TVE reforms). This also led to a 
reduction in regional inequality and massive poverty reduction (Demurger et al. 
2002). We contrast this to India, which is among group 2 members with mostly 
sustained accelerations and more modest rural output growth. India experienced 
modest agricultural growth thanks to its Green Revolution, which took place primarily 
in the North Western states, such as the Punjab. However, in the 1990s, especially, 
growth primarily occurred in the urban economy, including the services sector. The 
question of whether poverty has really decreased in India in the 1990s has been hotly 
debated but almost certainly it is modest at best (Deaton, 2003), with most estimates 
suggesting the absolute number of poor has actually increased. Other countries in this 
group have had also experienced mixed but generally modest agricultural 
performance, although Egypt, Syria and the Dominican Republic were the best 
performing countries among this group and also had the highest levels of agricultural 
development. 
In the next group (3), takeoffs were unsustained. These countries are notably 
marked by low levels of initial rural output and although these countries experienced 
periods and pockets of strong agricultural growth, none of these were sustained, and 
many of their rural sectors eventually deteriorated markedly. A standard pattern, 
especially in Africa, is volatile rural sector growth unaccompanied by failed industrial 
takeoff. Many of these states also experienced political strife. 
In group 4 we have three countries sometimes regarded as miracles. However, 
in all three countries, rural output was already quite high at the time of acceleration. 
Chile and Malaysia have long had well-performing agricultural sectors, although the 
Pinochet government additionally used targeted subsidies to boost agricultural 
performance. Chile’s growth should also be qualified, as land inequality, especially, 
prevented it from being pro-poor. Malaysia and Mauritius both had relatively well 
developed plantation economies with a strong presence of expatriate entrepreneurs so   15
that these economies were well placed to launch industrialization strategies. The 
group 4 countries can best be compared to other Latin American economies with 
initially high output levels but failed industrialization processes. Growth in Brazil was 
particularly fast in both sectors in the 1960s, but was not pro-poor because 
government assistance favoured large farmers (World Bank, 1990). 
The last two groups consist of countries which are notably rich in natural 
resources. But where Botswana and Indonesia have been successful, the Republic of 
Congo and Nigeria have been disasters at one time or another. In Botswana, strong 
agricultural growth accompanied development from the very beginning. In Indonesia, 
growth in the petroleum sector actually preceded agricultural growth but the 
Indonesian government - striving to pacify the rural population and to prevent a 
communist-inspired popular revolution - avoided the resource-corruption curse of 
other resource-rich countries by transferring massive resources to the rural sector 
whilst maintaining a stable political and macroeconomic environment (Pritchett, 
2003; Timmer, 1994). 
In conclusion, the data in Table 3 strongly confirm the stylized fact that 
agricultural development is necessary (but not sufficient) for industrial development 
and structural transformation. Although there are indeed countries in which 
agricultural growth did not translate into successful industrialization (e.g. Latin 
America), no successful country achieved structural development without either first 
reaching a reasonably high level of rural development (Mauritius, Egypt), or rapid and 
sustained agricultural growth (Tunisia, China, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Botswana), 
or both high levels and high growth (Chile, Malaysia). Moreover, if we only consider 
the poorest countries, a club in which China, Korea, Taiwan, Botswana and Indonesia 
were recent members, it is immediately clear that rural development is an essential 
component of the first stages of economic progress.  
Finally, these conclusions are in no way qualified by the well-known finding 
that the share of agriculture in national GDP declines with development (Chenery and 
Cherquin, 1975) or the related and more recent attention to the growth and poverty 
reduction potential of the rural non-farm economy (Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001). In 
and of themselves, these facts do not illuminate the important transmission 
mechanisms that link agricultural productivity improvements to broader growth, both 
in the rural non-farm economy (as Lanjouw and Lanjouw themselves point out) and in 
the urban economy. In other words, agricultural growth is an integral part of structural   16
transformation, not its obstacle. Thus to argue for investments in agriculture, as we 
do, is not to favour agriculture over industry, or to practice some other form of 
agricultural fundamentalism. Growth strategies for low-income countries that aim to 
bypass agriculture will almost certainly fail to achieve their intended goal. Moreover, 
non-agricultural growth strategies are much more likely to neglect the rural and urban 
poor. 
 
3.  Agriculture and Poverty Reduction 
 
The growth of agricultural output and agricultural wages is the most effective means 
of reducing poverty in the poorest countries. In this section we review a very large 
body of evidence which validates this conclusion.  
A separate focus on poverty reduction is important for several reasons. First, it 
is the goal of most development agencies and policymakers to eliminate poverty in the 
short and long term, as well as achieve economic growth and other social goals. 
Second, it is theoretically possible that tradeoffs exist between poverty alleviation and 
economic growth in the short run, but as we have argued in the previous section and 
shall again argue here, in the poorest developing countries it is highly unlikely that 
such tradeoffs ever exist. Rather, it is much more likely that virtuous circles exist 
between agricultural development, poverty alleviation and long run growth and 
development. But even were this is not the case, eliminating poverty as 
comprehensively and quickly as possible is a pressing concern in its own right. 
Assuming then that our desideratum is to eliminate poverty as efficiently as 
possible, how could we go about it? The first question of relevance is ‘Who are the 
poor?’ since this determines how policymakers should target them. The 2001 World 
Development report estimated that 1.2 billion people world wide live below a PPP $1 
per day poverty line. The proportion of these people that are rural is estimated to 
range from 62% (CGIAR) to 75% (IFAD); that is, there are about 744 to 900 million 
rural poor worldwide. Most of the rural poor reside in South Asia, East Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa, and while poverty has declined in much of Asia, Chen and Ravallion 
(2000) show that it has increased substantially in Africa. The second question is 
‘Given that the majority of the poor are rural Africans and Asians, how should we 
target them?’ Even though the poor are chiefly rural, this does not necessarily imply 
that we should bundle more resources into agricultural development. After all, rich   17
countries are industrial, and they have very few poor, so industrial development offers 
a viable alternative, in principle at least, to agriculture-led poverty alleviation.  
But consider what an industrial poverty reduction strategy would necessarily 
entail. First, industrial development – by which we mean a strategy in which most 
developmental resources are devoted to industry – does not directly or immediately 
influence the majority of the poor, who are rural. If industrial development is to 
influence the rural poor, it must do so via increased demand for food, which will 
increase rural incomes only insofar as agricultural produce is non-tradable, and 
through urbanization and subsequent employment in the urban industrial sector.  Let 
us examine these two mechanisms more thoroughly. 
First, the partial (and perhaps increasing) tradability and the natural elasticity 
of demand for agricultural produce, together with falling food prices, renders the 
effectiveness of demand-driven poverty reduction highly uncertain. Second, 
urbanization can be motivated by rural underdevelopment rather than successful 
urban development, as Harris and Todaro (1970) illustrated many years ago. Fay and 
Opal (1999), for example, find that urbanization has occurred in Africa despite 
unsuccessful urban development. This is almost certainly because agricultural 
conditions were so poor in Africa that even urban un- or under-employment was an 
attractive alterative to rural poverty in most African countries. This type of 
urbanization is push-urbanization, because people are pushed off the land, rather than 
pull-urbanization, where people are pulled towards the cities by successful 
industrialization, as Lewis (1954) originally envisaged. The significance of push-
urbanization is that it is unlikely to reduce poverty because it constitutes, in the short 
run at least, a mere translation of the poor from rural to urban areas. Indeed, De 
Janvry and Sadoulet (2000) present evidence that this was a common occurrence in 
Latin America where productivity growth has been low and uneven, and where land 
inequality is usually high. Although Fay and Opal (1999) do not directly present such 
evidence for Africa, the phenomenon is plausibly true there, too, given the evidence 
that urban poverty has increased in countries such as Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe (World Bank, 2003). An industry-led poverty reduction plan is 
therefore risky and generally irrational when most of the poor are rural.  
In contrast, agricultural-led growth immediately influences the incomes of the 
majority of the poor, empowers an often under-empowered group (which may reduce 
future urban biases) and also has stronger indirect effects on urban poverty via the   18
reduction in food prices (again conditional upon the tradability of food) and the 
reduction of push-urbanization and its consequent urban unemployment. Thus 
agricultural-led growth strategies are always safer and sounder in countries where the 
majority of the poor are rural.  
Turning to the facts to date, the evidence amply confirms theoretical 
reasoning: agricultural development is a consistently successful strategy for poverty 
reduction in those regions where the majority of the poor are rural. Numerous studies 
suggest that increasing agricultural productivity has been the single most important 
factor in determining the speed and extent of poverty reduction during the past 40 
years. Datt and Ravallion (1996) showed that rural sector growth in India reduced 
poverty in both rural and urban areas, while economic growth in urban areas did little 
to reduce rural poverty. Warr (2001) provided evidence that growth in agriculture in a 
number of South East Asian countries significantly reduced poverty, but this was not 
matched by growth in manufacturing. Gallup et al. (1997) showed that every 1% 
growth in per capita agricultural Gross Domestic Product (GDP) led to 1.61% growth 
in the incomes of the poorest 20% of the population – much greater than the impact of 
similar increases in the manufacturing or service sectors. Ravallion and Chen (2004) 
find large spillover effects from agricultural development on poverty in China. Thirtle 
et al. (2003) review recent empirical work confirming the positive effects of sectoral 
growth on poverty reduction, including cross-country studies by Bourgignon and 
Morrison (1998),  Timmer (1997), De Janvry and Saddoulet (1996) as well as nine 
case studies in India, greater South Asia, East Asia and Latin America . Thirtle et al. 
(2003) also conclude from fresh cross-country regression analysis that, on average, 
every 1% increase in labour productivity in agriculture reduced the number of people 
living on less than a dollar a day by between 0.6 and 1.2%. Timmer (2002) and 
Bravo-Ortega and Lederman (2005) establish econometrically that agricultural labour 
productivity significantly increases the incomes of the poorest (bottom-quintile 
incomes); Bravo-Ortega and Lederman additionally show that this result holds   19
without heterogeneity across geographical regions
7.  More recently, 12 detailed case 
studies analysed by Byerlee et al. (2005) that increased agricultural productivity plays 
in promoting pro-poor growth. In sum, there seems to be very little doubt indeed that 
any other sector of the economy shows such a strong correlation between productivity 
gains and poverty reduction. 
 
4.  Agricultural Development and the Public Sector 
 
Growth and poverty reduction via agricultural growth requires active and long-term 
involvement by the public sector in shaping and facilitating technological innovation 
and market development.  
Many modern theories of growth identify technological progress (rather than 
mere accumulation) as the driving force of long run growth. However, insofar as we 
are interested in medium run growth, more realistic growth models identify the 
adoption of foreign technologies (technological catch-up) as the chief mechanism of 
growth, which very much requires the accumulation of savings and foreign exchange, 
as well as the optimal inter-sectoral allocation of public resources. Studies of 
successful East Asian development, for example, have shown that it entailed high 
investment in physical and human capital with relatively low levels of indigenous 
technological progress (Young, 1995), but high levels of technological adoption 
(Bosworth, 1996; Kim, 1997, 1999; Kim and Lau, 1994; see Timmer, 2002, for a 
good discussion of the debate between accumulists and assimilists). 
Moreover, technological adoption theories are as relevant for LDC agriculture 
as they are for industrial development in countries such as Korea and Taiwan. Studies 
of the Green Revolution (GR) have frequently shown that genetically engineered 
crops have only been successful where their sowing has been accompanied by high 
levels of complementary input accumulation. Murgai (2001), for example, looks at the 
                                                 
7 Bravo-Ortega and Lederman (2005) is the only study we found which is critical of the pro-poor 
potential of agriculture (but not on the growth impact), claiming their ‘econometric evidence refutes the 
conventional wisdom’. Closer scrutiny calls this claim into question as it is based on regression 
coefficients for their whole sample of 84 countries, including high-income countries which exhibit 
negative effects of agricultural productivity on incomes in all quintiles. When correcting for this in 
table 4 in Bravo-Ortega and Lederman (2005), it seems that in the sample of low-income countries  
(especially those outside Latin America) agricultural productivity has a larger positive effect on 
incomes in all quintiles (including the poor) than non-agricultural productivity, as all studies quoted by 
us show. Thus Bravo-Ortega and Lederman’s ‘refutation’ appears to be based on data from high-
income countries only, where there never was a ‘conventional wisdom’ that agriculture causes growth   20
GR in India’s bread basket, the Punjab, from 1960 to 1993, and finds that, contrary to 
most views, productivity growth was surprisingly low during the GR years, when 
modern hybrid seed varieties were adopted, but increased in later years after adoption 
was essentially complete. Murgai concludes that the underachievement in initial 
productivity growth was substantially due to the delayed investment in 
complementary inputs, such as in improved resource management and public 
infrastructure. 
This is equally relevant to Africa. Mosley (2001) contends the notion that a 
GR is destined to fail in Africa because of inherent technological barriers. Rather he 
views the barriers to agricultural development as resource-related (especially low 
levels of investment in rural infrastructure) and policy-related, since many African 
countries faced distortionary trade policies at home, while all of them effectively 
faced distortionary policies abroad.  Similarly Dorward et al. (2003, 2004, 2006) note 
that many technological solutions to Africa’s productivity problem currently remain 
‘on the shelf’ due to institutional bottleneck factors related to failing states and lack of 
attention to institutional design by the development community (see also Wiggins, 
2000). DFID (2005a) notes that a common characteristic of successful Green 
Revolution adopters was the primacy awarded to agriculture in national development 
efforts, and the role played by the state in supporting agriculture by providing (and 
often subsidising) key inputs, general and sector-specific infrastructure (notably 
irrigation) and product market interventions to ensure stable, predictable and 
remunerative prices. Through such instruments, governments have created a lower 
risk environment for agricultural innovation and increased its affordability for small-
scale farmers with considerable success. 
This arguments fits in with the wider recognition that historically successful 
development has been predicated on ‘developmental states’ providing public goods 
and co-ordinating market processes (e.g. Stigltz, 1998). However, it is not simply the 
usual publicly provided goods – roads, rail, electricity, water - which require 
government resources. Market failures which are mostly particular to the 
underdeveloped rural sector often necessitate government intervention of one form or 
another. Incomplete or missing markets due to information asymmetry, high 
transaction costs, labour market distortions, extreme volatility and covariance of 
                                                                                                                                            
and poverty reduction.   21
incomes (resulting in missing agricultural insurance markets), and the indivisibility of 
many rural investments (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997) all imply that governments 
are justified in executing Second Best (e.g. in the provision of rural finance) or even 
Third Best policies (e.g. in the direct provision of capital if financial intervention 
fails). 
Despite these solid theoretical grounds for government intervention in the 
sector, agriculture has received a disproportionately small allocation of public 
resources over the last three decades in low-income countries. Public resource 
allocation to agriculture has declined as a proportion of total aid, especially in the 
1990s (World Food Summit, 1996; World Bank,  2003; DFID, 2005b). This trend is 
true of a variety of donors (multilateral, bilateral, OECD donors, all donors) and in all 
regions of the globe. DFID (2005b) reports, based on OECD DAC figures, that the 
global volume of assistance to agriculture (expressed in 2002 prices) decreased by 
nearly two-thirds from US$ 6.2 billion to US$ 2.3 billion between 1980 and 2002. 
Most of this decrease occurred during the 1990s. Over the same period, however, total 
aid flows provided by all donors (again measured in real terms) increased by 65%, 
from US$ 37.1 billion in 1980 to US$ 61.4 billion in 2002. Most of this increase 
resulted from a jump from 45.8 to 61.4 billion US$ during 1999–2002. So, while the 
total volume of assistance provided to agriculture has decreased in real terms, its share 
of total aid has fallen even more, from a peak of 17% in 1982 to 3.7% of total aid in 
2002. In many cases, the proportion of agricultural aid in total aid virtually halved in 
just five years from 1993 to 1998. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where the agricultural 
sector is still very large indeed, the reduction was less dramatic but still very large, 
with agricultural aid levels halving between 1980 and 2002 (from 1,450 to 713 
million dollars in constant 2002 terms). 
There are two caveats to interpreting this trend as an indication that real public 
resource flows to the agricultural sector have indeed declined. First, given 
urbanization, and given that total aid has increased over the years, it is probably more 
relevant to measure trends in real agricultural aid per rural inhabitant, as we do in 
Figure 1 for the total period 1973 to 2001, again using OECD DAC data on aid 
commitments. Since a measure of average aid per rural inhabitant could be biased by 
demographic differences between countries, we compute rural population weighted 
averages (with and without China and India) as well as simple averages.  But the 
conclusion that agricultural aid per capita has markedly declined since 1985 is entirely   22
robust to these different measures (Figure 1). Moreover, if one excludes China and 
India, then population-weighted rural output per capita has also declined over this 
period by some 26%, so that decreasing agricultural aid and rural output have 
declined more or less contemporaneously.  
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Population weighted average
Unweighted average
Population-weighted average (no China or India)
 
 
A second caveat is that foreign aid flows are not an ideal measure of public 
resource allocation. Since 1980, an increasing proportion of foreign aid is delivered in 
terms of program or multi-sector aid, which may then be allocated towards the 
agricultural sector, while there have also been changes in the definition of agricultural 
aid.
8 If aid in general is highly fungible, then considering aid allocation to individual 
sectors can be quite misleading. In order to address this we have analyzed data on 
central government resource allocation to the agricultural sector from the IMF’s 
                                                 
8 The OECD’s DAC statistics on a sectoral basis from 1973 onwards only covers aid commitments, not 
aid disbursements. Nevertheless, although commitments are only typically turned into disbursements in 
the next one to three years and may be a  biased measure of actual disbursements in the presence of 
natural disasters and political changes (Headey, 2005), there are no other reasons to suspect that they 
are not an accurate indicator of real resource transfers at an aggregate level. Of more interest, forestry 
and fishing were included in earlier data, but identified as separate sectors from 1996 onwards. These 
two sectors may constitute as much as 20% of total agricultural aid, but in most countries the 
proportion would be significantly less. Also, the current definition excludes: some ‘rural development’ 
which may be classified as multi-sector aid; food aid; and, sometimes, assistance provided through 
NGOs since this is not always ‘sector coded’ in as much detail as project and programme aid. While 
these important caveats apply to foreign aid flows, they do not apply to government expenditure flows, 
which are discussed below. Moreover, the decline in agricultural aid preceded the 1996 change in 
definition. 
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Government Finance Statistics. We attempt to incorporate all central and regional 
government expenditures where possible for a broad range of developing countries. 
Due to the incompleteness of the data we look at broad trends rather than exact 
measures or complete time series. Table A1 in the appendix documents agricultural 
expenditure and some other trends for a large number of countries; table 3 below 
provides summary statistics by region. Column 2 indicates the number of countries in 
the region, columns 3 and 4 indicate average labour productivity in the agricultural 
sector and its average annual growth rate over the period 1970-2001, respectively. 
Columns 5 and 6 show public agricultural expenditure as a percentage of total 
government expenditure and per rural worker. The last column defines the correlation 
between the trend in agricultural expenditure per worker (levels and trends) and 
labour productivity growth into one of five levels: strong (++), moderately strong (+), 
no correlation (0), moderately negative (-) or strongly negative (--). Because of two-
way causality between output growth and agricultural expenditure we report only 
associations here. 
 
Table 3. Regional labour productivity and public expenditure: levels and trends 
Sample Labour  productivity 
(LP) 
Public agricultural expenditure 
(AE) 


















trend & level) 
(++, +, 0. -. --) 
South America 
 
7 3327  2.6  4.0  416  0 




6 180  1.6  6.4  249  ++ 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
6 140  3.7  5.6  417  ++ 
sub-Saharan 
Africa 
11 338  0.5  7.5  31  + 
East Asia 
 
7 870  4.4  8.8  291  ++ 
 
Sources: Labour productivity data is from Alauddin, Headey and Rao (2005). Government expenditure 
data is from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (various years) and was compiled by the authors.   24
 
Our findings can be neatly summarized on both an inter- and intra-regional 
basis and are as follows. First, resource accumulation matters as much as or even 
more than technology driven growth in the agricultural sector, and is probably best 
described as a necessary complementary input to technological factors, be it internal 
technological progress or technological adoption of foreign techniques. This seems to 
be especially true for the Green Revolution countries, the most successful of which 
poured significant resources into agriculture (Mexico, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, 
China, Korea, with Middle Eastern and North African countries arguably constituting 
a second group). Other low-spending GR countries floundered (India, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, Bangladesh, Colombia, Ecuador). Although this hypothesis warrants further 
corroboration at an international level, the limited analysis conducted here seems to 
confirm the insights of Murgai (2001), Mosley (2002) and others who argue that the 
main reason the Green Revolution failed to spark rural development in many 
countries was due to insufficient public investment. 
A second conclusion relates to aggregate trends in public resource flows to the 
agricultural sector, which have generally decreased, either in terms of foreign aid 
flows per rural worker, or in terms of domestic government expenditure figures. 
Unfortunately this trend is especially strong in regions where agricultural progress is 
the main weapon in the war against poverty and stagnation. 
 
5.  Understanding the Paradox: Urban Biases and Shifting Paradigms 
 
So far, we have posed what might be termed an Agricultural Paradox in development: 
publicly financed agricultural investments are of large and continuing developmental 
importance for growth and poverty reduction (sections 2 and 3), yet development 
resources devoted to such investments have generally been small and have largely 
been decreasing in recent years (section 4). In this section we attempt to explain the 
Paradox in terms of (i) long-standing political economy factors which fall under the 
broad umbrella of “urban biases” and (ii) a more recent shift in development thinking 
and practice, away from sectoral issues and structural change and towards concerns 
with markets functioning (the ’Washington Consensus’) and with poverty reduction 
(as expressed in the Millennium Development Goals). 
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5.1  The Political Economy of Urban Biases 
As we noted in our introduction, economists have been aware of urban biases since 
Myrdal’s Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions. The term was first used 
and popularized by Michael Lipton (1977), who went further than most in identifying 
this bias as probably the single greatest institutional impediment to economic 
development of the least developed countries. The concept itself is multidimensional, 
and there may be many ways in which urban biases evolve and express themselves.  
Byerlee et al. (2005) argue that there are two broad interpretations. The first 
type of bias is manifested in an explicit, autonomous industrialization strategy that 
favours urban areas.
9 Such a strategy is generally justified by what we view as 
misinterpretations of stylized facts, such as the structural transformation identified by 
Chenery and Syrquin (1975), and early economic theory, especially the Lewis theory 
of growth. As we noted earlier, the Lewis model identified the traditional agricultural 
sector as a source of cheap (low opportunity cost) labour, savings and demand for 
modern goods. Although the original Lewis model was more nuanced than the 
industrialization strategies which claimed to follow it – Lewis, for example, did not 
claim that the modern sector could not be agricultural, nor that agricultural 
development was not necessary to keep food prices low – the model ignored several 
important issues. First, labour was homogenously unskilled, so that the importance of 
human capital was clearly overlooked. In fact, a reasonably educated labour force 
appears to have played an important part in the development of both the agricultural 
and industrial sectors of the East Asian miracles (World Bank, 1990). Second, the 
model ignores or at best glosses over other conditions for successful industrial 
development, such as a sufficient supply of entrepreneurship, macroeconomic 
stability, public infrastructure and a sufficient degree of labour-intensity in industrial 
production techniques. Third, and most importantly, the model ignores the other kind 
of urban bias, one derived from political economy factors. 
This second bias endogenously evolves out of social and political factors, 
Political factors include the lower costs and greater effectiveness of urban political 
                                                 
9 The bias is autonomous in the sense that an industrialization strategy may result from the 
discretionary choice of policymakers. As the we allude to below, however, what constitutes an 
autonomous decision and what constitutes an endogenous result of socio-political forces is never clear, 
for even when policymakers cite a formal growth model as the justification for a policy decision, there 
always remains the possibility that such a theory is chosen to rationalize socio-political goals. So in 
some sense, if one believes that the second bias exists pervasively, then the first bias may be regarded 
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mobilization (Lipton, 1977; Lal and Myint, 1998; Bates, 1988; Binswanger and 
Dieninger, 1997), as well as the small short-run supply elasticity of agriculture which 
allows short-sighted politicians to tax the sector at a seemingly low expense 
(Johnston, 1960). Social and institutional factors include race and caste differences 
between the elite and the rural poor, and attitudes derived from colonial institutions 
which often favoured urban elites and fostered elitist attitudes towards the working 
masses (Myrdal, 1957; see also Binswanger and Deininger, 1997). 
These political factors and cultural allegiances may be just as strong in 
democracies as in authoritarian regimes, especially when politicians are short sighted, 
when ideological rhetoric can be used to distract voters from the development 
priorities, and when the rural poor are illiterate and generally misinformed. India, for 
example, is a democracy in which the urban bias has existed (and arguably still does) 
in all its forms: as a formal development strategy, as a post-colonial institution, as a 
manifestation of race and caste differences, and as a manifestation of a wide variety of 
political failures. 
The interactions between the two kinds of urban biases – the autonomous and 
the endogenous - are very important for understanding the initial trend of increasing 
neglect of agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s, and its persistence despite an increasing 
awareness of that neglect, chiefly due to the work of Little et al. (1971), Lipton (1977) 
and Krueger et al. (1993). In retrospect it should be no surprise that urban elites 
adopted industrialization strategies which heavily favoured their own interests as well 
as the interests of the rural elite.
10 As we suggested above, Lewis unfortunately 
ignored the possibilities for urban biases, even though such biases were likely to be 
manifest in the dualistic societies which were precisely the subject of his model.
11  
There still remains something of a paradox, however. Since numerous 
prominent economists have identified these urban biases, why haven’t these biases 
been broken down? A first answer is that if urban biases are primarily of the second, 
endogenous kind, we should not be surprised that breaking them down is a difficult 
                                                 
10 As Lipton noted, biases against traditional agriculture need not necessarily be urban biases. In 
countries with dualism within the agricultural sector, it invariably seems that owners of large farms, 
plantations or haciendas are invariably able to extract a disproportionate amount of government 
resources (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997). In many cases, urban biases and rural or land inequality 
go hand in hand, and such connections are again strengthened by political economy and cultural 
factors.   
11 In fact, Lewis was well aware of the demographic dimension of dualism, noting that the urban elites 
were often racially distinct from the working classes, and frequently expatriates. Despite this, Lewis 
did not identify institutional dualism as a significant obstacle to development of a dualistic economy.   27
task (even if the international development community actively addressed the 
problem) precisely because an endogenous urban bias is a stable socio-political 
equilibrium in that it is consistent with the desires of those who hold economic and 
political power. Moreover, market failures in the agricultural sector can strengthen the 
stability of this equilibrium through a vicious circle: market failures inhibit 
agricultural development, low growth in the agricultural sector appears to justify the 
allocation of resources to other sectors, so the market failures are never corrected by 
Second Best government interventions, and so on.
12  
But the tragedy of the urban bias in primarily agricultural LDC economies is 
matched by the equally tragic and rather ironic bias in favour of agriculture in 
primarily industrial OECD countries. In these countries the development of primarily 
federalist democratic institutions means that, if anything, the agricultural sector is 
over-represented in political decision-making. Thus, agricultural sectors in many 
OECD countries have been able to extract high levels of effective protection for their 
sector. Although this is to the obvious detriment of LDC agricultural exports, in 
practice it is impossible to accurately predict how large the benefits of redressing this 
situation will be. They depend very much on reforms within LDC countries and 
compatible investment in rural infrastructure in tandem with the timing and pattern of 
a possible reduction of subsidies and protection in OECD agriculture. But where such 
studies have been undertaken, the estimated benefits for LDC agriculture are almost 
invariably hypothesized to be large, if unevenly distributed. 
An ABARE study analysed the impacts of agricultural trade liberalization 
using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, with dynamic and static gains 
estimated (ABARE, 2001). It found that global GDP would increase by US$123 
billion relative to the base case, with more than half these gains going to developing 
countries that are either producing or are capable of producing the commodities that 
are currently most heavily supported in the developed countries such as livestock 
products, grains, oilseeds, sugar, fruit and vegetables. Many developing countries 
could step up their production of the aforementioned commodities and increase 
exports (Thailand (rice and sugar), China (fruit and vegetables), Brazil (sugar), 
                                                 
12 Moreover, land inequality is unlikely to change without direct government intervention since land 
also serves as collateral in information-asymmetric financial markets. In fact, in areas with initial 
inequality and reasonably high population densities, the value of land often easily exceeds the income 
stream resulting from agricultural production. When this is the case, land inequality is likely to increase 
still further.   28
Malaysia, Indonesia and Argentina (vegetable oils), Zimbabwe (tobacco) and Pakistan 
(cotton)). Whilst sub-Saharan African countries are certainly underrepresented in this 
list, these countries nevertheless contain much of the rest of the world’s rural poor. 
Thus, rural biases within OECD countries are still a formidable source of 
underdevelopment in LDC agriculture. 
Urban biases are frequently talked about, but rarely measured except in an 
indirect manner, in terms of trade biases as in the works of Little et al. (1970) and 
Krueger et al. (1991) or, as in the previous section, by analyzing trends in agricultural 
aid and government expenditure. But an obvious problem with looking at agricultural 
expenditure is that it describes a potential input to agricultural development, but tells 
us nothing about the outcomes achieved (which is important since the composition 
and efficiency of government expenditure is likely to vary considerably), whilst trade 
biases against agricultural are difficult to measure for a large cross-section of 
countries. We therefore attempt to measure urban bias outcomes to match the 
theoretical discussion above. Our general proxy for the degree of urban biases is the 
percentage of the urban population with access to safe water less the equivalent rural 
percentage circa 2000, based on data from WDI (2004). This variable was 
successfully used in Alauddin, Headey and Rao (2005) to explain agricultural 
productivity trends. 
Table 5 documents these urban-rural infrastructure differences for a wide 
range of countries. Table 4 validates the measure by explaining it in terms of some of 
the theoretical causes of urban biases (expected signs in parenthesis): initial labour 
productivity (-), land inequality (+), land area (which proxies for the political isolation 
of rural pressure groups) (+), the strength of democratic institutions (-), and a sub-
Saharan Africa dummy (-). All the variables have the right signs and are significant at 
conventional levels, and the R-squared is a high 0.60. 
Table 5 indicates several observations of note. The difference between urban 
and rural safe water infrastructure is remarkably large on average (with a mean of 27 
percentage points), indicating that urban biases are indeed highly prevalent around the 
developing world. However, the measure is also dispersed (a standard deviation of 14 
percentage points). Countries with very low urban biases include many fast growing 
agricultural economies as well as agricultural economies that are already quite 
developed, not all of which are explained by high agricultural expenditure levels 
(Malaysia, Egypt, Iran, Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand, Uruguay). The next group of   29
moderately low discriminators against agriculture includes some success stories 
(Korea, Indonesia, Syria) and many moderately successful performers (India, 
Ecuador, Burkina Faso (with high growth by African standards), Argentina). The final 
two groups includes mostly poor or moderate performers, although there are two or 
three potential exceptions, such as admittedly highly unequal Brazil, Mexico and 
Chile, but also relatively egalitarian Tunisia and Chile. However, each of these 
anomalies is arguably explicable in one way or another, and we acknowledge that this 
proxy is far from perfect.
13  
To summarize, there is a robust theoretical basis and significant empirical 
evidence which suggests that urban biases are as persistent as ever, and manifest 
themselves in a highly unequal distribution of public resource outcomes. 
 




Labour Productivity, 1970  -2.41
 5.49
Land Area  6.96
 2.40
Democracy (1-10)  -2.56
 4.21
Land inequality  0.66
 6.59
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy  10.59
 2.48
R-squared 0.59
Adjusted R-squared  0.53
Notes: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent 
Standard Errors & Covariance 
 
*The urban bias proxy is the proportion of the urban population with access to safe water less the 
equivalent rural proportion. The source of both variables is the WDI. 
                                                 
13 Chile, Mexico and Brazil all have high levels of inequality, so that their growth has not been 
substantially pro-poor. Mexico, China and Tunisia have had very high expenditure per capita, and 
China’s result is somewhat inconsistent with other measures of urban-rural differentials, such rural 
illiteracy rates (only 26%, about half the average of a sample of 20 developing countries). A better 
measure of urban biases would incorporate educational and other rural-urban differentials, but such 
data does not exist for such a large range of countries. The absence of important measures such as 
rural-urban differences in infrastructure, education and health is arguably another manifestation of an 
urban bias. The WDI, for example, contains many more measures in the male-female dichotomy 
(around 26) than the rural-urban dichotomy (5).   30
Table 5. Comparisons of an urban bias proxy* 
 
Low Moderately  Low Moderately  High High 
Iran   15.0 Vietnam  30.5 Cameroon  42.5 Ethiopia  66.0
Venezuela 15.0 Syria  30.0 Brazil  40.5 PNG  56.0
Guatemala 14.5 Burkina  Faso  29.0 Nicaragua 40.5 Madagascar  54.0
Niger 14.0 Senegal  28.5 Tanzania  40.5 Kenya  53.0
Pakistan 13.5 Sri  Lanka  28.5 Mozambique  40.0 Malawi 49.0
Mali 13.0 Zimbabwe  28.5 Ghana  39.0 Iraq  48.0
Honduras 12.5 Cambodia  28.0 Morocco  39.0 Chile  45.0
Algeria 12.0 Korea,  Rep.  26.0 Nigeria 37.5    
Philippines 11.5 South  Africa  26.0 Bolivia  37.5    
Thailand 11.5 Indonesia  25.5 Saudi  Arabia  36.0    
Costa Rica  7.0 Argentina  24.0 Guinea  36.0    
Chad 5.0 Cote  d'Ivoire  24.0 Peru  35.5    
Uruguay 5.0 Myanmar  23.0 Tunisia 35.5    
Bangladesh 4.0 Burundi  21.5 Paraguay  34.0    
Egypt 4.0 Colombia  21.5 China  33.5    
Turkey 3.0 India  21.5 El  Salvador  33.5    
Malaysia 0.0 Sudan  21.5 Mexico  32.0    
   Ecuador  19.5       
   Nepal  18.0       
*The urban bias proxy is the proportion of the urban population with access to safe water less the 
equivalent rural proportion. The source of both variables is the WDI. 
 
5.2  The Washington Consensus  
Whilst biases against agriculture within LDC governments are understandable in light 
of political economy theory, this cannot fully account for the bias against agriculture 
amongst foreign aid donors noted in section 4. This should be regarded as especially 
surprising give that, in the development consensus view loosely known as the 
‘Washington  Consensus’  (Williamson, 1990), intervention in favour of industry at 
the expense of agriculture has been deemed especially deleterious to LDC growth 
prospects (Little et al., 1970; Krueger et al., 1991). Thus we have a paradox within a 
paradox. 
Understanding the paradoxical neglect of agriculture by the Washington 
Consensus requires a brief consideration of the historical determinants of its 
evolution. In the 1970s and early 1980s, agricultural development was very much on 
the development research agenda after the surmised failure of import-substitution 
industrialization strategies (which biased resources away from agriculture) and the 
early success of the Green Revolution. However, a greater shift in this period towards 
a more comprehensive intellectual consensus on the importance of agriculture in 
development was obstructed by several factors, all of which were especially   31
prominent within the Washington Consensus. Criticisms of the urban biases inherent 
in import-substitution industrialization strategies were intimately tied to the 
neoclassical, public choice-theoretic criticisms of government interference in general; 
for example, Anne Krueger’s work embodies both (Krueger, 1974; Krueger et al., 
1993). This meant that although the Washington Consensus called for the reduction of 
effective taxes on agriculture, it also reduced government support for agriculture.
14 In 
the current perspective that was throwing away the baby with the bath water: the 
important objective of agricultural development, an objective in which government 
investment was absolutely critical, took a backseat to the total reduction and 
restructuring of the role of LDC governments. This Washington Consensus approach 
was most influential in the heyday of political neo-liberalism from the mid-1980s to 
the late 1990s but continues to dominate development thinking
15. Our first aim in this 
section is therefore to explain the effective bias against agriculture that has come to 
dominate development – as evidenced most clearly in aid figures – by considering its 
dominant paradigm on economic polices, the Washington Consensus. 
In the development community, the most active and powerful proponent of 
‘Washington Consensus’ style policies has been The World Bank (WB). A good 
illustration of its stance in the case of agriculture is its 1996 report titled ‘The World 
Bank Goes to Market’. Our focus on the WB is motivated by is role as the long run 
development arm of the WB-IMF partnership and a leading research institution in 
which development practice and practical research are intimately linked. Our second 
aim in this section is therefore test whether such a effective bias against agriculture 
bias exists operationally within its most influential institution and long-run 
development arm, the World Bank. 
We have already noted that agricultural aid declined across the board, and not 
just for WB or IMF aid, grant or loan recipients. The more specific hypotheses we 
wish to test here is that Washington Consensus efforts to promote development via 
market-oriented reforms (‘liberalization’) in LDCs directly led to reductions in 
agricultural expenditure and that intellectual priorities within the WB have shifted 
away from agriculture.  
                                                 
14 In fact, it is also possible that agricultural expenditure may have decreased even more than other 
forms of expenditure as the result of reform. However, to our knowledge, such a claim has not yet been 
tested.   32
For an empirical assessment of the first claim we studied agricultural 
expenditure trends in nine countries which are argued to have engaged in Washington 
Consensus Style reforms. Figures A1 to A9 in the appendix present the findings. The 
year of greatest reform is defined as that in which the economy became “open” as 
defined by the Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index. In all nine countries, 
agricultural expenditure decreased after reform. However, the net benefits of reform 
appear to have been quite varied. In Mexico and three South American countries 
(Chile, Bolivia and Peru) labour productivity in agriculture increased after reform, so 
that the net benefits of reform appear to have been positive.
16 However due to high 
inequality and weak linkages in South America, there are no clear benefits to broader 
growth and poverty reduction in South America from agricultural productivity gains 
in the region (e.g., Bravo-Ortega and Lederman, 2005). In the other countries in the 
sample, reform did not alter the stagnating or declining growth paths of these 
countries. Thus Washington Consensus reforms in agriculture in this sample appear to 
have brought sectoral productivity improvements without broader growth benefits in 
some cases, but reforms mostly have had neither pro-growth nor pro-poor impacts. 
Thus it was not simply the case that World Bank aid to agriculture declined along 
with the broader decline in agricultural aid. The World Bank and IMF were also 
instrumental in forcing or persuading LDC governments to reduce their own 
expenditures across the board, with the agricultural sector apparently being especially 
hard hit. 
We now turn to test the second claim that intellectual resources devoted to 
agriculture have also declined. Despite the strong intellectual case for the 
developmental importance of agricultural investments (and therefore for 
contemporary research into it), there seem to be good a priori reasons to expect that 
agriculture has been receiving less attention in World Bank research, and perhaps 
even in general academic research, given the strong connections between the two. 
Such factors include the shift away from urban bias critiques (e.g. Little et al., 1970) 
towards general market fundamentalism, the decline in state financing of independent 
research institutions within OECD countries, as well as the general tendency 
                                                                                                                                            
15 Although currently widespread talk of the ‘Post Washington Consensus’ (Stiglitz, 1999; Rodrik, 
2003) suggests that this liberal approach is on the wane no economic development paradigm has yet 
emerged to replace it. 
16 Moreover, Chile can not really be regarded as a Washington Consensus ‘star student’ as its policy 
reforms were primarily internally driven.   33
throughout the economics profession to favour fads over fundamentals, a factor whose 
influence should not be underestimated.
17  
We test the claim that agricultural research has declined in relative terms for 
both World Bank research and general academic research by conducting systematic 
word searches of World Bank working papers, World Bank World Development 
Reports, and finally, for four major general academic journals on development. In 
Figure 1 we examine World Bank Working Papers by searching the World Bank’s e-
Library. Data cover the period 1994 to 2005.
18 We derived two figures measuring the 
importance of agriculture in the World Bank’s working paper research agenda: the 
proportion of papers with words containing the letters “agricultur” in the paper’s 
abstract; and the proportion of papers classified by the World Bank as “agriculture 
and rural development” papers. In Figure 1, we do indeed see a quite dramatic trend 
of decreasing emphasis on agriculture as a subject of World Bank research. In the 
period 1994-98, around 14% of World Bank working papers dealt with the 
agricultural sector, but in the period 2003-2005, this declined to around half that, or 
7%.
19 Thus, the intellectual resources devoted to agriculture in the World Bank 
roughly declined by about the proportion as World Bank IDA aid to agriculture over 
the 1990s, which decreased from 19.7% in 1990 to 10.3% in 2000 (see also Section 
3). Finally, we note very little difference between agricultural research and broader 
rural research, with the sole exception being the period 1999-02.  
                                                 
17 This latter factor may be especially significant. Professional economists of all persuasions generally 
hope to achieve career goals by adding something new and novel to the existing body of knowledge, 
and this is no less true of development economists, however worthy their rhetoric. This thirst for 
novelty, whilst arguably being the very source and motivation for scientific progress, can also cause 
problems when fads replace or obscure fundamental truths (Turnovsky, 1991). Such ‘fad fetishism’ 
should be distinguished from other sources of disagreement between economists (Duhs, 1982) which 
also have at their root ideological and methodological differences (though these also play a role in the 
debate at hand, especially the influence of the Washington Consensus). Also, fad fetishism is partly 
justified. There are indeed a bewildering array of obstacles to development. However, the point made 
throughout this essay is that many obstacles to development can be viewed as sector-specific – that is, 
influencing agriculture or industry/services – and that the neglect of agriculture occurs at an aggregate 
level, through substantially underemphasising agricultural development as one of the fundamental 
objectives during the early stages of development.  
18 Data prior to 1994 are available, but the total number of publications is well under 100 for all these 
years and could therefore be misleading for a number of reasons. The period 1994-2005 excludes data 
for 1999, in which about 7 times the normal number of working papers were published, for reasons not 
yet established. Inclusion of 1999 data did not radically change the trend in the data, but did mean that 
1999 data were constituted a large outlier for the “agriculture and rural development” category, since 
this proportion was only 7.0%, a much lower value than 1998 (14.7%) or 2000 (15.4%). It was 
therefore excluded on this basis. 
19 Although we note that in absolute terms the number of papers on the agricultural sector in 2005 was 
quite high relative to previous years. However, the total numbers of working papers had obviously 
risen proportionately.   34
Working papers are one means of gauging World Bank output, but another 
important source of World Bank influence are the World Development Reports 
(WDRs). These are also more indicative of the large emphasis on fads and novelties in 
development research, rather than on fundamentals. The Reports purport to review 
“major development issues”, which according to the titles change on a yearly basis. 
Figure 2 lists the titles of all World Development reports from 1978 to 2006 along 
with average “agricultur*” words per page counts which we take as a proxy for the 
importance of agriculture in these reports. The measure appears to be a good one, as 
noted by the correlation between the title of the report and the word counts. Looking 
at the data, there are several facts of note. 
Firstly, the importance of agriculture varies tremendously from report to report 
- word counts per page range from 1.24 to 0.01, or a ratio of 124 to 1 - indicating the 
degree to which the reports focus on topics of contemporary appeal. Secondly, many 
of the topics one would expect to have been more closely connected to agricultural 
development actually score very low: health (0.04), infrastructure (0.06), investment 
(0.04), the State (0.09) and even the topic of the most recent 2006 Report, equity and 
development (0.16). But thirdly and most importantly, we once again observe a 
strongly declining trend in the importance of agriculture over this period. The heyday 
of agriculture in development (at least in theory, but also in terms of aid and direct 
government finance), the late 1970s and early 1980s, was a period in which 
agriculture received substantial prominence in the WDRs. The period 1978-1986 
stands out in particular, with an average word counts score of (0.51), which compares 
favourably indeed with the remainder of the period (1987-2006), with an average 
word count of just 0.18 (the one exception in this trend being the 2002 “Building 
Institutions for Markets” report).  
To what extent these disturbing trends apply to other donors is difficult to 
judge, but Mosley (2001) points out that the 2000 DFID White Paper discusses 
smallholder agriculture, “on which 900 million poor people globally depend”, in a 
“mixed two-page section on natural resources as a whole . . . which is much less space 
than is allocated to the internet, on which no poor people depend at all.” Moreover, 
the MDGs make no specific references to agricultural development, while the MDGs 
Project Director, Jeffrey Sachs (1997), has suggested that African countries abandon 
the attempt to develop a comparative advantage in grains crops. We discuss the 
MDGs in more detail below.   35
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International Capital & Economic Development 1985
Population Change & Development 1984
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Agriculture & Economic Development 1982
National & International Adjustment 1981
Poverty & Human Development 1980
Structural Change & Development Policy 1979
Prospects for Growth & Alleviation of Poverty 1978
 
* These reports actually cover 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 respectively.   36
 
The next question is ‘Are academic economists as prone to neglect of 
agriculture as professional development practitioners?’ On the one hand, academic 
economists surely face many of the same incentives to strive for novelty as World 
Bank researchers, and arguably with greater intensity. But on the other hand, their 
research interests are less likely to be influenced by bureaucratic forces, and may 
therefore be regarded as more independently determined.
20 We therefore expect to 
find some shift from agricultural research to more broadly defined rural research but 
not as large as is the case for World Bank writings. Such a finding would be in 
keeping with the general trends we noted in aid delivery, which has seen a reduction 
in agricultural aid in favour of general program and multi-sector aid.  
In a manner similar to analysis of World Bank research, we again analysed the 
prominence of topics related to agriculture and rural development in the academic 
development economics literature. Using the combined literature database of 
‘EconLit’, we conducted a search for book entries and articles which appeared in four 
prominent development journals over the last quarter century which had “agricultur*” 
or “rural” in their abstracts.
21 Specifically we focussed on four leading development 
journals - World Development, Journal of Development Economics,  Journal of 
Development Studies, and Economic Development and Cultural Change - separately 
for the five five-year periods from 1980 to 2005, and again calculated percentages of 
agriculture and rural development related items in the totals. 
Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix present the count and percentage data on 
articles and book entries on agriculture and rural development in all articles and book 
entries, per journal and over time
22. Figure 1 below depicts the development of the 
                                                 
20 Naturally, of course, there is some overlap between World Bank Working Papers and published 
academic articles, as the former often end up as the latter, but we do not expect this to seriously 
confound our results. 
21 We considered that examining abstracts would strike a good balance between keyword searches 
within titles (which would be too narrow) and searching full texts (where ‘agriculture’, ‘agricultural’ or 
‘rural’ might be mentioned without any real analysis). Also, we note that this is only a subset of all 
relevant writings, as some unsystematic searches also turned up items without our keywords but with 
‘farming’ or ’smallholder’ in their abstracts, which clearly should have been included. However their 
numbers seem sufficiently small to still trust that their inclusion would lengthen the presentation of 
findings but not significantly change the present search results.  
22 The search results slightly overstate the number of articles. Some articles are listed twice in the 
EconLit database, for instance ‘The Impact of “Market-Friendly” Reforms on Credit and Land Markets 
in Honduras and Nicaragua by Steven R Boucher in World Development of January 205, Vol. 33 Issue 
1, p107-128, 22p which once appears with the addition ‘(AN 15669597)’ and once without it. We 
considered but did not find evidence that such double listing is biased towards books and articles on 
rural and agricultural topics, or that it is more common in some time periods or some journals than it is   37
percentages for the four journals taken together. Figure 2 presents percentages, taken 
over the entire period 1980-2005. 
The findings are interesting primarily for how different they are to those of our 
World Bank analysis. First, academic interest in agriculture and rural development has 
been increasing rather than declining, in contrast to World Bank research in the 1990s. 
The share of articles and book entries on ‘green’ topics in the four leading journals 
nearly doubled between 1980 and 2005, from 8% to and 14 %. Nevertheless, the 
emphasis on agricultural development in academic journal is now no larger than it 
was in World Bank working papers in the mid 1990s, around 14%. Third, since 1990 
there is a marked decrease in writing on agriculture relative to publishing on broader 
rural topics. The latter category increased its share in all writings by about a third, 
from 6.6% to 9.7%, while the former decreased by a quarter from 6.1% to 4.6%, in 
keeping with our secondary hypothesis. Most of this divergence occurred after 1995. 
Finally we also note considerable variation between the four journals, with the 
Journal of Development Studies having about twice as many articles and book entries 
on (particularly) rural topics compared to the Journal of Development Economics, 
relative to their total outputs. 
In summary, academic economists have actually increased their emphasis on 
agricultural development in the last twenty years (albeit marginally), whilst the 
relative importance of agriculture in World Bank research has substantially decreased 
since 1994. This divergence probably reflects several factors, including the extent of 
disagreement between the relatively homogenous views of World Bank researchers 
and the more heterogenous paradigms of academic economists, as well as important 
differences in their research environments. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that these two 
divergent trends in any way cancel out. The World Bank is singularly important both 
as a provider of aid, as a policymaker, and as a major influence on other donors and 
policymakers. Thus, it should hardly be surprising that we have noted a declining 
trends in agricultural aid, a declining trend in most LDC government’s agricultural 
expenditure budgets, and a declining trend in the intellectual resources devoted to 
agricultural research within what is arguably the most important aid donor and 
development research institution.   
                                                                                                                                            
in others. Therefore we did not go through the exercise of identifying and removing all such double 
listings. 
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Figure 4: Percentages of all book entries and articles on agriculture and rural 
















*The 1980-85 data are for keywords in the title since the search in abstracts does not work for 
this period. Source: ECONLIT  
 
Figure 5: Percentages of all book entries and articles on agriculture and rural 
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5.3. Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
With the increasing criticism on the Washington Consensus since the late 1990s (e.g., 
Stiglitz, 1999) the paradigm has been augmented in the familiar Kuhnian process of  
adding ‘protective belts’ to ‘normal science’ without adapting its core assumptions. 
Rodrik (2003) terms this augmented paradigm the Washington Consensus Mark II, 
the key feature of which is the increased emphasis on short-term poverty reduction in 
addition to economic rationalization goals.  
This augmented paradigm finds its most cogent expression in the UN’s 
Millennium Development Goals (a project directed by a neoclassical economist, 
Jeffrey Sachs) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (administered by the 
World Bank). The Poverty Reduction Strategy Process requires governments of 
developing countries to formulate poverty reduction policies in line with achievement 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and to monitor and report on progress 
in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The MDG/PRSP approach to 
development is very much micro-economic, focusing almost entirely on factors that 
directly and immediately affect the lives of poor people (health, education, sanitation, 
discrimination, and so on). Unlike the original (Mark I) Washington Consensus, it 
does not argue for a consensus view on economic policies but instead focuses on 
social outcomes. Laudable though these objectives are in themselves, the new focus 
serves to divert attention away from the challenges to the Washington Consensus, 
allowing Washington Consensus policy practice to continue in tandem with the 
MDG/PRSP project. Indeed Washington Consensus (Mark I) style polices and 
pursuance of MDG objectives are frequently portrayed as complementary and their 
joint pursuance is even invoked additional justification of the familiar market-oriented 
reforms by Sachs (2005). Thus the MDG/PRSP project in development practice is not 
a replacement of the original Washington Consensus, but an augmentation of it. 
Our hypothesis is therefore that also this second and more recent paradigmatic 
shift, towards the MDGs/PRSPs, does not favour investments in agriculture. The main 
reasons are: 
 (i) its inherent neglect of agricultural growth issues 
(ii) its institutional identification with a Washington Consensus style approach to 
economic policies; and  
(iii) its lack of focus generally (one criticism, at least, which could not be made of the 
original Washington Consensus).    40
We briefly expand on each of these points. First, one should note that the 
MDG/PRSP project is focused on short-term (pre-2015) improvements in a large 
number of well-being indicators, ranging from poverty headcounts to infant mortality 
to education enrolment rates. Since most of the poor are rural, the MDG/PRSP project 
is perhaps implicitly concerned with rural well-being broadly defined. However, this 
concern does not necessarily imply an emphasis on investments in – still less public 
support programs for - the agricultural sector, for two reasons. First, the full benefits 
in terms of poverty reduction via agricultural investments and its linkages to the wider 
economy materialize over the course of decades, not years. Agricultural sector 
programs do not provide guarantees of delivering improvements in most of the 48 
indicators monitored in the MDG project within the nine years until 2015. Yet this is 
precisely the avowed aim of the project, and thus there is an incompatibility in 
timeframes between agriculture-led and MDG/PRSP development paradigms. 
Second, even if MDG/PRSP aims would occasionally be seen to require 
agriculturally focused polices, the endorsement of a sectoral and state-led 
development emphasis would clash with continuing support of Washington 
Consensus style ‘market-compatible’ policies. Since the same institutions – notable, 
the World Bank – endorse and implement both the MDG/PRSP and the Washington 
Consensus, such a clash would be difficult to manage and therefore less likely to 
occur. This conflict still exists precisely because the MDGs and PRSPs are politically 
convenient appendages to the existing neo-liberal paradigm, rather than corrections to 
the original Consensus that go the heart of its problematic theoretical assumptions and 
weak empirical foundations. 
Third, another reason why substantial investments in agriculture have been 
unlikely in the current development climate is the sheer fragmentation of its 
development objectives. The evidence we documented above suggests that the most 
successful agricultural transformations - as well as graduations to middle-income 
countries - have been preceded and accompanied by a focus on agricultural 
investments that absorbed a substantial part of a country’s resources and was 
consistently sustained over a number of years (most often, decades). Case studies of 
most NICs make this clear (e.g., Rodrik, 2003). Such focus and stamina is precluded 
by a simultaneous focus on 48 short-term development indicators inducing a thinned 
spread of limited development resources. (Quite apart from that, none of the 
indicators is directly connected to the agricultural sector.)   41
Summing up, inherent in the current MDG/PRSP development paradigms 
there are reasons of political ideology, of policy scope, of institutional implementation 
and of policy time frame that preclude the focused and sustained investments 
necessary  for  an  agricultural  transformation.  In order to assess these claims 
empirically, we study rural development aspects of 32 Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs). The rural focus is justified since comparing only rural to urban issues 
would still leave us with the problem that any broad rural poverty concerns need not 
imply any serious attention to agricultural transformation issues as also argued in our 
literature analysis. We therefore look directly within the rural content of the PRSPs. 
Our propositions are twofold: (a) that the rural content in PRSPs is typically 
concerned with broader rural well-being, not about the agricultural sector per se; and 
(b) that PRSPs will not accord primacy to any single goal or even to a limited set of 
goals. Both propositions follow from MDGs-inspired development practice, as 
described above.
23 
  In order to gauge how resources are distributed and how agriculture fares in 
actual practice, the analysis of PRSPs is carried out on two dimensions. It considers 
two indicators of policy making quality, for each of nine issues in the rural economy. 
The policy quality indicators are: (i) the formulation of targets or indicators and (ii) 
the formulation of policy actions. The nine rural issues are: farm income, non-farm 
income, gender, human development, economic infrastructure, natural capital & 
productivity, financial assets, social capital and finally macro-micro linkages. For 
each issue, one or several topics were studied in a reading of the 32 PRSPs
24. For 
instance, the issue of ‘human development’ was detailed into three topics: education, 
health and the labour market. An assessment of these three human development issues 
was captured in a brief summary. These summaries were then reflected in a score on a 
0-3 scale, where score 0 indicates that the issue is not mentioned in the PRSP, score 1 
indicates that the issue is mentioned in the PRSP but not elaborated, score 2 indicates 
                                                 
23 In studying these documents, we are aware of the possible gap between actual practice and policy 
intentions articulated in PRSPs, partly due to tensions between the goals of the International Financial 
Institutions and those of domestic policy makers, partly also to the normal rift between policy 
documents and policy implementation. Still, we would argue that studying PRSPs is the closest one can 
come to a standardised observation of intended development practice under the MDGs/PRSP paradigm, 
while still yielding findings that are comparable over countries.  
24 The PRSPs we consider are on Albania, Azerbaijan, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Tanzania,   42
that the issue is also elaborated, and a 3 score indicates that the issues is discussed in 
line with internationally accepted standards (‘good practice’). Dividing actual scores 
by maximum scores (three times the number of questions on the topic) produces 
‘relative scores’ fractions comparable over issues (there were between one and five 
topics per issue).  
  We study how much weight PRSPs give to the presence of targets and 
indicators and the formulation of concrete policy actions for the issue most directly 
related to agriculture, which is farm income, in comparison to the other issues relevant 
to broader rural development. We also consider what PRSPs suggest on policy 
resources being concentrated or thinly spread.  
Table 6 summarises the findings on agriculture versus broader rural 
development. The left-hand columns present the simple mean of scores by rural 
issues, averaged over all 32 PRSPs. The right-hand columns present the percentage of 
the sample of PRSPs in which concrete policy and targets & indicators towards the 
issue are even mentioned (i.e. with positive scores). The findings indicate that farm 
income scores lowest of all on all four counts with the exception of social capital, 
which scores lower still. In contrast, both ‘policies’ and ‘targets & indicators’ on 
natural capital and productivity (other than related to farm income) score highest. 
The results in Table 6 are also consistent with our second hypothesis, that the 
MDG/PRSP-style approach to policymaking will spread resources thin across all the 
goals, and not accord primacy to any particular goal. The mean relative scores 
indicate that the average across all targets is low (0.3 out of 3) and no target scores 
higher than 0.49 out of 3. This finding was also confirmed by calculation of 
Herfindahl concentration indices (data available on request). 
To summarise, the PRSP approach indicates that LDC policymakers are likely 
to both neglect agricultural development and generally spread resources too thin; our 
reading of 32 actual PRSPs supports this. Thus, even the most recent development 
paradigm still effectively embodies a bias against agriculture. 
                                                                                                                                            
Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen and Zambia. We thank World Bank staff for making these data available. A 
full description of the analysis and an overview of findings is in World Bank (2006).   43
Table 6: The Rural Content of PRSPs 
  (Mean relative scores)  (% of sample) 









        
Farm income 
 
.16 .08 34  19 
Non-farm income 
 
.23 .08 47  22 
Rural gender 
 
.34 .14 63  31 
Human development 
 
.34 .17 91  63 
Economic infrastructure 
 
.27 .19 94  84 
Natural capital & productivity 
 
.49 .30 100 94 
Financial assets 
 
.35 .13 97  59 
Social capital 
 
.16 .03 26  9 
Macro-micro linkages 
 
.34 .13 100 75 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has attempted to persuade readers of the inefficient and systematic bias in 
the allocation of developmental resources over the last three decades, with the bias 
running against the agriculture sector in the least developed countries. We have shown 
that a large mass of historical evidence suggests that such a bias is detrimental to 
economic growth and structural transformation, as well as poverty reduction. 
Moreover, the most successful developing economies – as gauged by high rates of 
equitable growth - are those in which the government played a very active role in the 
agricultural sector. Despite this weight of economic theory and historical evidence, 
however, foreign aid and domestic government expenditures to this sector have 
declined remarkably in the last twenty years, while harmful OECD trade practices 
also persist. This Agricultural Paradox – the importance of, but simultaneous neglect 
of LDC agriculture – is not explained by any single factor. Certainly there are urban 
biases in LDC governments, but these are also manifest within foreign aid agencies. 
Perhaps the most disturbing conclusion in this study is that the deeply harmful 
biases against agriculture are still not being redressed. In fact, if anything the key 
failures of the original Washington Consensus – especially its failure to live up to its 
self-stated objective of redressing the bias against agriculture – have not been 
addressed by the Mark II form of the Consensus, which chiefly just appends a greater 
focus on poverty reduction – embodied in the MDGs and PRSPs - to the old neo-
classical workhorse. Instead, this augmented Consensus simply threatens to repeat the 
mistakes of the past and moreover spread developmental resources uncomfortably 
thin in the years to come. Unfortunately, it is the poor – rural and urban – who will 
ultimately pay the price for this continued neglect. Appendix A. Tables and Figures 
Table A1. Agricultural output per worker and agricultural expenditure per worker trends, all LDCs, various years 









agric exp. as 
% of govt 
exp. 




5. Trend in agricultural expenditure per 
worker 
Bangladesh  1973-1985  20 0.9  12.1  28 No  trend 
 
Bolivia  1972-201  1018  2.1 1.9 87  Declining 
 
Brazil 1972-1999  2710  6.3 4.3 302  No  obvious  trend 
 
Burkina Faso  1976-1994  146  2.8  4.8  6  Increased until 1988 
 
Burundi 1991-200  230  -0.6  4.8  15  Heavily  declining 
 
Cameroon  1976-200  474  0.9 4.7 32  Declining 
 
China    1990-1999  427  4.7 5.7 286  Increasingly  rapidly 
 




1973-1997 1968  3.1  13.4  467  Increasing  in  1990s 
Egypt  1975-1997  804  3.7 4.5 162  Increasing  significantly 
 
El Salvador  1972-201  1065  1.1  5.0  94  Increasing from 1972-1982, decreasing 
since, now at 1972 level 
Ethiopia 1982-200  201  -0.2  9.3  19  Increasing 
 
Ghana  1972-1994  457  -0.1  6.8  33  Rapidly decreasing since 1981 
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Table A1. continued 
Country  Timeframe  1.    2. 3. 4. 5. 
Guatemala 1972-1979; 
1988-1994 
763  0.4 4.0 51  Decreasing 
India  1974-201  382  1.8  6.6  41  Increasing 1974-1984, no trend thereafter 
 
Indonesia  1976-200  514  2.1 8.4 121  Slightly increasing trend until 1997, when 
it decreases markedly 
Iran  1980-1997  1604  4.3 5.0 412  Slightly  increasing   
 
Kenya 1972-1999  330  -0.1 8.3  48  Slightly increasing until 1989, decreasing 
thereafter 
Korea  1972-1998  1099  14.0  7.2  723  Rapidly Increasing,  
 
Madagascar  1988-200  389  -0.7  11.0  6  Decreasing until 1993, increasing back to 
original levels thereafter 




2217  5.4  6.2  623  Rapidly increasing until 1981, steady 
thereafter 
Mexico*  1972-200  2025  2.1  7.5  501  Declining significantly from very high 
starting values. 
Morocco  1972-200  962  2.0  4.1  192  Increasing until 1978 then steady 
 
Myanmar  1973-1995  30  1.5  17.2  41  Increasing until 1985 then decreasing to 
original levels 




1675 -0.1  4.8  179  Decreasing   47 
Table A1. Continued 
Country  Timeframe  1.    2. 3. 4. 5. 
Nigeria 1972-1978; 
1984-1988 
430  5.0  5.0  50  Slightly higher in second period. 
Pakistan  1973-1987  534  2.9 2.1 17  No  trend 
 
PNG 1975-1999  725  0.1 6.1 85  Mostly  decreasing  trend 
 




937  0.9  8.4  330  No trend in first period, indications of 
declining trend from 1985 to 2001. 
Philippines  1972-201  987  1.2  7.7  113  Trough from 1980 to 1988. 
 
Sri Lanka  1972-201  586  0.0  9.1  261  No trend except for massive surge in 
1980s 
Syria 1972-200  2173  4.2 8.3 913  Increasing  trend 
 




1972-1999 1580  5.9  10.0  775  Strongly  increasing. 








10,888  1.8 1.4 276  Mostly  increasing  trend. 
Venezuela  1972-1987  3074  3.0 6.1 1745  Decreasing until 1993, increasing back to 
original levels thereafter 
Zimbabwe 1976-1989; 
1993-1998 
394  -0.5  8.1  84  Mostly decreasing trend Appendix Figure A1-A9. Agricultural expenditure per worker (grey line), output per worker (black 
line) and liberalization episodes (black column) 
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Table A2. Articles And Book Entries On Agriculture And Rural Development In Four 
Development Journals, 1980-205 (Counts) 
years   80-85  85-90  90-95  95-0  0-05  80-05 
          
journal keyword  (counts) 
          
JDS agricultur*  21 19 32 39 27  138 
 rural  18 27 47 64 55  211 
 either  39 46  79 103 82 349 
 all  278 40 467 594 562  2301 
  
      
WD agricultur* 17 8  54 99 67  245 
 rural  25 9 67  108  157  366 
 either  42 17 121  207  224  611 
 all  414  590  917  1407 1274 4602 
         
EDCC agricultur*  26 30 22 20 31  129 
 rural  37 24 17 18 28  124 
 either  63 54 39 38 59  253 
 all  408 406 370 349 398 1931 
         
JDE agricultur*  17 27 32 32 11  119 
 rural  14 22 20 22 45  123 
 either  31 49 52 54 56  242 
 all  476 678 541 609 695 2999 
         
All four  agricultur*  81 84 140  190  136  631 
 rural  94 82 151  212  285  824 
 either 175 166 291 402 421 1455 
 all  1576 2074 2295 2959 2929  11833 
Source: Literature databases EconLit and EBSCO Business Source Premier and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: (i) WD=  World Development, JDE =  Journal of Development Economics, JDS =Journal of 
Development Studies, and EDCC =Economic Development and Cultural Change. (ii) Keywords were 
searched for in abstracts only except for WD 1980-1985, which reflect title searches. (iii) ‘agricultur*’ 
refers to  all keywords starting with  ‘agricultur’- most probably, either ‘agriculture’ or ‘agricultural’. 
Table A3. Articles And Book Entries On Agriculture And Rural Development In Four 
Development Journals, 1980-205 (percentages of totals) 
years   80-85  85-90  90-95  95-0  0-05  80-05 
          
journal keyword  (percentages) 
          
JDS agricultur* 7.6 4.8 6.9 6.6 4.8 6.0 
 rural  6.5 6.8 10.1  10.8 9.8  9.2 
 either 14.0 11.5 16.9 17.3 14.6 15.2 
         
WD agricultur* 4.1 1.4 5.9 7.0 5.3 5.3 
 rural  6.0 1.5 7.3 7.7  12.3  8.0 
 either 10.1 2.9 13.2 14.7 17.6 13.3 
         
EDCC agricultur*  6.4 7.4 5.9 5.7 7.8 6.7 
 rural  9.1 5.9 4.6 5.2 7.0 6.4 
 either 15.4 13.3 10.5 10.9 14.8 13.1 
         
JDE agricultur* 3.6 4.0 5.9 5.3 1.6 4.0 
 rural  2.9 3.2 3.7 3.6 6.5 4.1 
 either 6.5 7.2 9.6 8.9 8.1 8.1 
         
All four  agricultur*  5.1 4.1 6.1 6.4 4.6 5.3 
 rural  6.0 4.0 6.6 7.2 9.7 7.0 
 either 11.1 8.0 12.7 13.6 14.4 12.3 
         
Source: Literature databases EconLit and EBSCO Business Source Premier and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: (i) WD=  World Development, JDE =  Journal of Development Economics, JDS =Journal of 
Development Studies, and EDCC =Economic Development and Cultural Change. (ii) Keywords were 
searched for in abstracts only, except for WD 1980-1985, which reflect title searches. (iii) ‘agricultur*’ 
refers to  all keywords starting with  ‘agricultur’- most probably, either ‘agriculture’ or ‘agricultural’. 
‘All’ refers to the total number of articles and book entries.  (iv) The ‘either’ categories may slightly 
differ from the sum of the ‘‘agricultur*’ and ‘rural’ categories due to rounding. The same applies to the 
periods total.   51
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